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Introduction. January 1973 wit-
nessed the end of the longest continual 
armed conflict in the 200-year history 
of the United States. Sixty days after 
the signing of the Paris agreement, the 
longest recorded incarceration of Ameri-
can prisoners of war (POW's) ended for 
more than 500 men, over 450 of whom 
had been held in the Democratic Repub-
lic of Vietnam (DRV). Several of these 
men had endured more than 8 years as 
prisoners of the DRV, while one POW 
held by the Vietcong was detained over 
9 years. 
The POW's received a warm and 
tumultuous welcome from the people of 
the United States. This served to create 
a unanimity among Americans which 
had been lacking during the long years 
of the Vietnam conflict. The Nation's 
public display of pride and relief was a 
genuine show of interest and concern 
for "their" POW's. 
The Vietnam POW's, however, were 
not the irrst prisoners of war who had 
received publicity. Those American men 
who had been held prisoners in all 
recent wars have been the subject of 
public examination, and their return to 
the United States has provided a great 
deal of human interest news copy. 
The post-Korean period was the most 
lucid example of such investigation. 
Eugene Kinkead's widely read book, In 
Every War But One, based on 
The source material for this article is 
drawn from the author's 6 years of imprison-
ment in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam 
-his experience and observations plus the 
narratives and reflections of 118 other pris· 
oners with whom he, at various times, shared 
a cell. 
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psychological factors that influenced 
the prisoners, emphasized the poor con-
duct of American POW's in Korea. 
Similar works combined with the con-
clusions reached in the Secretary of 
Defense Advisory Committee POW 
Report prompted the issuance of the 
Executive Order Code of Conduct. The 
perceived necessity for an executive 
order delineating the expected standard 
of conduct for POW's was a de facto 
condemnation of Korean POW's. For 
the many U.S. servicemen who served 
honorably as POW's in Korea, it is 
unfortunate that the books defending 
their conduct, such as March to Cal-
umny, received less notoriety than those 
which condemned, but the intent here is 
not to debate the guilt stigma of Korean 
POW's nor to exonerate the innocent. 
Instead, it will be enough to note that 
such writings do exist. 
Now there exists another group of 
subjects, the Vietnam prisoners, whose 
experiences might substantiate, re-
pudiate, or expand upon the findings of 
the studies of prisoners held in previous 
wars. A military examination of the 
Code of Conduct's influence on Viet-
nam's POW's and its further applica-
tions, a psychological investigation into 
the personality effects of from 6 to 9 
years of foreign detention, and the 
sociological problems involved in living 
5 years with the same man under 
adverse stress conditions should be of 
intense interest for research. Indeed, the 
findings would be of value not only to 
military leaders and behavioral scientists 
but to any human beings who have 
more than a casual curiosity toward 
their fellow man. 
No amount of descriptive words can 
completely peel back the skin of the 
POW and reveal his inner self. But 
perhaps an acquaintance with the con-
fmed environment in which a POW must 
survive and some insight into the 
methods by which a man copes with 
this situation will help the reader better 
understand his actions. 
A prisoner's world is subject to a 
variety of influences, both internal and 
external, influences that can cause a 
man's perceptions to expand and con-
tract as the situation changes. Hence, 
conscious acts, willful choices, and re-
sistance motivations have shifting roots 
within a prisoner. For example, the 
rationale of a new captive differs from 
that of a man hardened by years of 
prison life; a consuming injury can alter 
one's outlook, and resistance with group 
support is not the same as standing 
alone. The expansion of individual ex-
periences to general behavioral axioms 
by which motives are assigned to all 
POW's is inherently dangerous, but 
some factors of resistance behavior are 
universal. Such general propositions 
observed to be true are examined in this 
paper. 
Capture and Interrogation. Consider, 
if you will, a pilot in the relative safety 
of a smooth flying jet aircraft with the 
comforts of a CVA "ready room II fresh 
in his mind. Suddenly he finds himself 
huddling in a flooded rice paddy-still 
shaken by the combined effects of his 
aircraft being hit, abrupt ejection, and 
an unwanted parachute descent to 
earth-"skivvie-clad" and tightly bound 
amidst a crowd of angry, club-waving 
Vietnamese peasants, screaming in a 
language unintelligible to him. He is 
now a prisoner of war! 
When such events occur in staccato 
fashion within 15 to 20 ririnutes, they 
represent an abrupt, disconcerting 
change. The most dominant emotion is 
a sense of bewildering fear at the alien 
surroundings and uncertainty of one's 
ultimate fate. Things held dear-friends, 
home, and family-take on greater im-
portance when they are no longer acces-
sible. Embodied in this sense of loss is 
the uncertainty of time. How long? 
Ever? 
Throughout captivity, this or some 
other form of fear is a prisoner's con-
stant companion, always capable of 
influencing his behavior. It is more 
accurate to say that in the years ahead 
the POW will learn to control his fear 
rather than conquer it. 
Behavior at such a time is patterned 
largely by instinct-one acts as a pro-
gramed individual and military man. 
Such programing is attributable to in-
formation bits acquired through age, 
cultural experiences, and training. That 
one's actions are instinctive means that 
resistance efforts draw on learning and 
values formulated earlier in life. For 
example, past survival school training 
and the ingrained k,nowledge that the 
Code of Conduct is the order of the day 
embody the spirit of resistance and give 
a man an instinctive modus operandi 
from the outset of captivity. 
The POW soon comes to realize that 
this patterned, instinctive reaction to 
events is his only guide on what to do 
next. He is alone, a helpless object 
vulnerable to the enemy's wrath. One 
manifestation of the subconscious lone-
liness is the relief one feels when an 
American aircraft passes overhead. This 
nostalgia and sense of kinship with 
other pilots was experienced by U.S. 
POW's in Hanoi during every bombing 
raid from May 1967 to April 1968, a 
brief respite from the gnawing loneliness 
inside each prisoner of war. 
The impact of this loneliness is fur-
ther intensified as the POW comes to 
realize that his programed, instinctive 
reactions will not cover every situation. 
He understands that at some point he 
must consciously deal with the question 
of how to relieve the constant pain of 
the binding ropes-without giving the 
inquisitors any information. 
Resolving the dilemma of resistance 
and survival is exacerbated by the strict 
rules that prevail in the captor-captive 
relationship. It is unlikely that an 
American prisoner has previously been 
involved in a contest in which the stakes 
have been so high and the regulations so 
invariable. A man's life in the United 
States is a series of second chances, 
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getting a break, or receiving a helping 
hand. But in a Hanoi interrogation cell, 
such relief does not occur. Here there is 
no chance that someone will enter the 
sweat-stained room with bumpy walls 
designed to muffle screams and say, 
"We will let you go this time, but don't 
do it again." 
Some would attribute the captive's 
resistance to loyalty or devotion to 
duty; and, in later periods of POW life, 
devotion to duty and patriotism may be 
an accurate description of resistance 
motivation. However, in the early days 
of captivity, pride is a more correct 
motivational assessment. Pride is a 
driving desire to prove yourself to your-
self and to those whose opinion you 
respect, and so strong is this desire for 
self-respect that many have endured 
torture to the point of crippling pain. 
The combination of pride and obliga-
tion seems to motivate men, time and 
time again, to resist to the limit of their 
endurance-despite the knowledge that 
the prisoner will probably be forced to 
conform in the long run. 
It is important to note that physical 
well-being as well as mental resolve 
influence a prisoner's conduct. Strong 
physiological needs are always present 
for a POW. Some men crave water even 
before their parachutes· deliver them to 
earth, and several sweltering days with-
out washing, plus involuntary immer-
sion in rice paddy water with a human 
excrement additive, produce an almost 
maniacal desire for a bath. For many 
men, maimed in the course of capture, 
physiological priorities center on in-
juries and a struggle to stay alive. Still, 
men with twisted legs, shattered arms, 
crushed faces, and flame-charred bodies 
do resist from the outset rather than 
seek aid by compromising their prin-
ciples. But such action is beyond the 
ordinary and cannot be expected from 
all. It is a strong motivation that induces 
a physically disabled man to select the 
arduous course of action because of 
what he knows is expected of him. 
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It has been stated that initial be-
havior is instinctive. Instinct is used here 
in the classical sensei in that the new-
ness of the environment dictates "trial 
and error" or "best guess" behavior 
based on innate feelings. However, as 
the years of prison transform new cap-
tives into oldtimers, and the bitter 
lessons are learned, a man is better able 
to determine proper courses of action. 
His actions are still instinctive in the 
sense that behavior is limited by the 
goals perceived as attainable,2 This 
prison maturity replaces earlier guess-
work, thereby enabling a POW to recog-
nize the frequent fluctuations in the 
captor's attitude and take advantage of 
these changes for his own benefit. 
Living Alone. The new captive is first 
thrust into another completely new and 
unnatural environment, that of living in 
solitary confinement. Few people have" 
ever lived for any length of time with-
out any form of human companionship. 
Both U.S. penal institutions and the 
1949 Geneva Conventions on Prisoner 
of War Treatment set 30 days of solitary 
as maximum punishment. A poll of U.S. 
POW's captured in the DRV before 
1969 reveals that 90 percent of the men 
endured solitary living conditions for 
periods ranging from a few days to more 
than 4 years, and an equal percentage 
had been subjected to physical torture. 
Men of varied personalities are affected 
by "solo" living in different ways. The 
combination of emotional stresses and 
physical hardships prompts hallucina-
tions within some new prisoners. Some 
memories of the first days in Hanoi are 
confused and dotted with haunting 
recollections of irrational outbursts and 
disturbing dreams. 
The physical condition of the cells 
within what became known as the 
"Hanoi Hilton" contributes to the de-
pressive state of a new POW. An 8-foot 
by 8-foot concrete room, bare board 
bunks, a heavy, iron-braced door with a 
shuttered peephole, and a small barred 
window looking onto a wall crowned 
with broken bottles comprise the ap-
pointments of his new home. The daily 
schedule is quickly learned, and the two 
meals do not fill the endless hours of a 
prisoner's day. To a "solo" prisoner, the 
daily fare of two meals has more value 
as a relief from boredom than as 
nourishment. Even the sporadic bathing 
schedule provides a welcome respite 
from the oppressing heat of one's cell if 
little else. A POW's bath entails dipping 
cold water from a tank resembling a 
horse trough and spreading it over one's 
body by means of a cup. 
The sound of the turnkey opening 
doors usually announces the time to eat 
or bathe, but the rattle of keys at an 
unscheduled time often means he will 
be called to a quiz. * Quizzes usually 
mean being called upon to do something 
against one's will, and there is a feeling 
of relief when the jingle of keys fades 
into the distance or when another's 
door is opened. 
It ought not to be surprising that in 
this isolated existence a POW seeks 
some contact with familiarity wherever 
he can find it. Something so innocuous 
as smoking a cigarette provides a feeling 
of security in that the act of smoking is 
a familiar experience, and, to one who 
has tried a Vietnamese cigarette, it is 
obvious that an ulterior motive is re-
quired to enjoy it. 
The pleasure derived from such 
familiar associations indicates the POW's 
desire to conquer his alien environment 
and to gain control of his emotions. 
Since knowledge is the armor by which 
we arm ourselves against adversity, a 
prisoner constantly strives to learn 
about his surroundings. Thus, the physi-
cal camp layout, the guard change 
schedule, and the turnkey's idiosyn-
*The term "quiz" was coined by POW's to 
denote prisoner meetings with some Vietna· 
mese representative of the camp organization. 
Quizzes could entail interrogation, propa-
ganda, discipline, torture, or indoctrination. 
crasies are all objects of study. A person 
knows he operates better in familiar 
surroundings or when he possesses the 
"home court" advantage. The POW sub-
consciously realizes that action under 
extreme emotional stress provides a 
poor basis for rational behavior. He is 
motivated to establish a better platform 
from which to act. 
A universal activity of solo POW's is 
to peer through cracks, under doors, or 
through the bars in the hope of seeing 
another POW. Despite Vietnamese ef-
forts to avoid even sight contact be-
tween Americans, a fleeting glimpse is 
occasionally available as a Yank shuffles 
from his cell to a quiz or to pick up his 
chow. Eventually the day comes when 
an "old head" is able to communicate 
with the "new" man. By means of a few 
well chosen wor;ds, spoken or written, 
the new man is given the tap code used 
for clandestine communication among 
POW's, advice on prison pitfalls, words 
of encouragement, and the senior offi-
cer's policy of resistance, called 
BACK-US.* This information is passed 
at great risk to the transmitter, for the 
camp maintains strict regulations against 
communication enforced by guards 
roaming the halls of the Hanoi Hilton 
who report even suspected violations to 
camp officers. To be caught means 
severe torture, as many prisoners would 
learn during the communication purges. 
A man named Ho Chi Minh once 
said, "Communication is the lifeblood 
of resistance." The impact of com-
municating is precisely that for the 
*BACK-US was an acronym which con· 
tained the essence of the senior officer's 
resistance policy in the Little Vegas area of 
the Hanoi Hilton in 1967. Each letter repre· 
sented the following: 
B-don't Bow when in front of cameras. 
A-stay off the Air, i.e., don't read on 
camp radi;.' 
C-you are not a Criminal. 
K-don't ,!gss the Vietnamese goodby by 




POW. For some POW's, covert com-
munication is their sole contact with 
others over a period of months and 
years. Any device capable of making 
noise may be used to transmit informa-
tion from the highest priority to idle 
chatter to pass the time and combat 
loneliness. 
A man in solitary with only rats for 
roommates also spends a great deal of 
time involved in introspection. His atti-
tude is a poignant mixture of feeling 
sorry for himself and seeing himself as 
one with a duty to perform. Thoughts 
center on assessing one's situation, pros-
pects, and the dilemma of how to exist, a 
dilemma which prevails for years. Reflec-
tions on the war are subject to the 
constant Vietnamese propaganda which 
the camp authorities provide through a 
crude wooden encased radio speaker in 
the window. Fortunately for the POW, 
the broadcasts are very naive and in-
tended for someone with no more than a 
seventh grade education or the right 
psychological set. 
'the POW's attempt to evaluate his 
situation prompts a circular reasoning 
that meanders through the present, past, 
back to the present, and ultimately to 
the future. When one accurately assesses 
the war, as he knew it prior to being 
shot down, certain questions begin 
cropping up: Who really cares about 
POW's? How often does anybody think 
of one who is a POW? What reasons are 
there to expect the war to end in 1, 2, 
3 ... years? 
The biggest question a POW poses to 
himself is, "How would I live my life if I 
were to live it over again?" To answer 
such a question, a man recalls many 
events and decisions of his past life and 
how alternate decisions might have al-
tered his present circumstances. A men-
tal playback of the events leading to his 
capture provides hours of speCUlative 
thought as to what went wrong. Ponder-
ing the decisions made earlier in life 
raises a fantasy of foregone occupations. 
The life of a schoolteacher, a business-
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man, or an airline pilot now seems to 
have greater appeal; and when one 
dwells on his past, thoughts linger on 
pleasant memories reconstructed in fine 
detail. Ultimately the question, "Why 
was that particular event enjoyable or 
important?" causes one to evaluate 
himself and ask, "What is important? 
What do I value?" 
The surfacing of values, the ex-
amining of past goals, and the facing of 
the reality of a prisoner of war situation 
lead most POW's to consider the 
dilemma of the present, the guilt felt by 
each man who has been forced to act 
against his will during initial interroga-
tions. Before talking to other POW's, 
each man perceives himself to be the 
only one who has given information. 
But every man knows he cannot endure 
the Vietnamese rope torture indefinitely 
without giving some information. The 
natural outcome of this thought process 
is to form a workable plan for the 
future, namely, a motivational force to 
resist, to honorably survive the trials 
that lie ahead. 
The early solitary period of captivity 
is marked by a high frequency of 
quizzes, intended largely to determine 
what type of prisoner a new man might 
become. Thus, there is ample oppor-
tunity for the prisoner to employ his 
newly devised plan of intended action. 
One is always, on these occasions, taken 
from his cell to a designated room to be 
quizzed alone, with only his convictions 
for support. One might say the general 
POW attitude at quiz, knowing one can 
be forced to comply is never to give 
"something for nothing." It is a point of 
pride that no information is given as 
long as the prisoner is capable of resis-
tance. 
Each prisoner formed his own judg-
ment of tactics employed by the inter-
rogators during quizzes, but several 
generalities seem to be widely held. The 
Vietnamese interrogator needed to feel 
that he was in control. Therefore, a 
direct challenge to his authority could 
not go unanswered. It was not necessary 
for the POW to yield control of himself 
to the interrogator but merely to con-
vey the impression of such. For ex-
ample, there were many instances when 
an uncooperative POW was told by the 
interrogator, "You know I can force 
you to answer, don't you?" When the 
POW acknowledged, "Yes, you most 
likely can," the question or demand was 
often dropped. 
It is also generally agreed that the 
interrogator had some preconceived 
answers to the questions he asked con-
cerning military matters and covert 
POW activities. If the POW perceived 
these desired answers to be erroneous, 
he responded to reinforce this error. 
However, when the Vietnamese had a 
correct answer in mind, an attempt to 
create doubt in the interrogator's mind 
was usually a better tactic than a flat 
denial of fact. Of course, these decep-
tive methods were not perfect, and, 
when unsuccessful, the POW ended up 
in ropes, on his knees holding up the 
wall, sitting on the stool, or in some 
other form of punishment. 
Perhaps the peak experience of this 
phase of a POW's life occurs when he 
makes a truly maximum effort to physi-
cally resist torture. *3 It may be the first 
time in his life that he musters every 
ounce of physical strength, mental 
courage, and determination. The feeling 
of being totally consumed by this effort 
is truly unique; and even when this 
maximum effort, with nothing held 
back, proves to be not enough, one at 
least feels pure and satisfied for having 
done his absolute best. Such an ex-
perience usually leaves a POW broken 
and physically disabled, but is none-
theless of great psychological value to 
him. 
*Maslow referred to the peak experience 
as ..... a self-validating self-justifying mo-
ment which carries its own intrinsic value 
with it." 
Living in Groups. Life in an 8 by 
8-foot cell with one, two, or three other 
men is nearly as unique as living alone. 
However, the absence of loneliness 
makes it considerably easier to cope 
with the difficulties_ associated with 
small group living. The_ axiom' "misery 
loves company" holds true. Close condi-
tions, where four men eat, sleep, and 
perform hygienic functions in the same 
room, require some adjustment and 
concession by all concerned. Individual 
physical traits of snoring or body odor, 
combined with personality idiosyn-
crasies of vulgar speech, braggadocio, 
and loquaciousness, can cause strained 
relations among roommates. However, 
with few exceptions, U.S. officers in-
terned in North Vietnam came to ap-
preciate the need for compromise and 
self-sacrifice for the good of the group. 
Accommodation becomes a way of 
life, and various means are employed to 
make existence tolerable. One such 
means is to routinize the events of the 
day and to rigidly maintain that routine. 
Planning such common events as exer-
cising, sweeping the floor, cleaning the 
cell, telling stories, and the time of 
communication with other cells serves a 
twofold purpose. It gives an element of 
order to life and permits some control 
of one's action. Otherwise a prisoner 
must perform the most common daily 
acts of eating, bathing, rising,. and going 
to bed at a time designated by the 
prison guards, and the schedule is sub-
ject to frequent unannounced changes. 
The value of order and self-control is 
best appreciated in the light of the 
prisoner uncertain ties and required com-
pliances. 
Routine also permits a POW the 
opportunity to vary his activity from 
time to time in order to relieve bore-
dom. An example would be to not 
exercise on the Fourth of July or to let 
another empty the ''honey bucket" 
because it is the duty man's birthday. 
Thus, to deviate from the routine be-
comes a form of celebration. 
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Another practice that may seem 
humorous is the method by which some 
POW groups parceled out food. The best 
method of handling the potential 
trouble of unequal food portions is to 
raffle off the meals and to rely on the 
"luck of the draw" method for distribu-
tion. Such procedures ultimately be-
come a source of entertainment as 
homemade dice are cast to determine 
which bowl of soup each man receives. 
An important element of harmony is 
a sense of humor in the illegitimae non 
carborundum sense. The ability to laugh 
in the face of adversity is a valuable 
asset. It is difficult to express how great 
it feels to laugh after months of crying. 
The man who finally has a roommate 
following months of solitary living is 
ready to laugh at anything, and the 
slightest provocation prompts uncon-
trollable hysterics. There can always be 
found an element of "sick prison 
humor" in the most dire situations. One 
could find a bit of humorous irony in 
being tortured to write a statement that 
he is being treated well. Since the 
situation appears humorous even today, 
perhaps the sickness still prevails. 
Living together in a small prison cell 
means constant association and inter-
action for 24 hours a day, not the mere 
8 hours a day at work or at home that 
most people equate with "knowing a 
person." In that respect, when a POW 
has the sante roommate for 2, 3, 4, and 
5 years, it is safe to conclude they know 
each other better than they know their 
wives. 
'f.he exchange of ideas that takes 
place among men in a common pre-
dicament and the knowledge they gain 
from each other can greatly broaden 
one's perspectives. There is no need to 
hide one's feelings on a subject for 
image purposes because one has no 
image. Roommates know each other in 
their true colors; and within the sanctity 
of one's small cell, the familiarity 
among POW's prompts an open ex-
pression of opinions on many subjects 
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that are not usually discussed at cocktail 
parties or in rap sessions. 
This atmosphere of frankness and the 
commonality of the situation make 
resistance behavior, its methods, limits, 
and consequences, a popular subject for 
examination. Decisions on the subject 
usually represent a consensus view 
rather than the dictates of the senior 
member of the group. The ultimate 
authority rests with the senior man, but 
"having one's say" removes the resent-
ment associated with an authoritarian 
environment and more firmly commits 
members of the group to a program 
they have helped to formulate. How-
ever, perhaps because a man's proud 
belief that his above-the-norm capability 
demands higher standards, group 
decisions tend to require less stringent 
_cqurses o~ action than those individually 
formed. 
Even small group membership en-
ables a man to project his thinking 
beyond concerns for his own survival. 
Resistance may now be viewed as a 
contribution to the war effort as well as 
individual responsibility. The adverse 
effects of his compliance with the 
enemy become more vivid when shared 
and discussed with roommates in the 
same predicament. Thus, as a man lives 
in closer union with his fellow POW's, 
his motives are more likely to become 
less selfish. 
Consensus decisions, common prob-
lems, and close quarters generate unity 
and esprit among members of the small 
group, a necessity if a group is to be 
effective. An indication that POW's 
possess these qualities and care for one 
another is evidenced by the prevalent 
atmosphere of gloom when a cellmate is 
at quiz. Genuine concern promulgates 
itself through unselfish acts of sharing, 
cheering up each other, or communi-
cating at great risk with a solo man 
purely for his psychological needs. 
Communication provides a sense of 
group accomplishment for it demands 
group effort. This function often 
requires two men to visually clear the 
area by watching for approaching guards 
while the other two men "communi-
cate." Each message successfully passed 
produces a euphoric satisfaction within 
the group. This reaction may appear 
overstated, but to a group whose pur-
pose is primarily negative, that is, not 
doing something, to accomplish any-
thing in a positive manner is significant. 
To dispel the notion that U.S. POW's 
held in the DRV were a group of 
superhumans, it seems appropriate to 
make some SUbjective observations of 
isolated individual behavior within the 
context of living together. Before 
October of 1969, when the treatment of 
POW's improved, torture abounded, 
solitary confinement was common, and 
very few men engaged in correspon-
dence with the outside world. During 
this period the most significant improve-
ment in POW treatment was that torture 
stopped. The POW's were then as-
sembled in large numbers, and this 
change in confinement prompted a 
change of attitude in some POW's. In 
this sanctuary from physical abuse, 
some men discovered a boldness within 
themselves and felt compelled to exhibit 
ultimate resistance. 
This could be called the "irons 
theory" in that POW's challenged the 
camp authorities to put them in leg 
irons and handcuffs again. Its advocates 
considered minor camp restrictions to 
be harassment that should be resisted, 
forgetting that for years prisoners were 
humiliated by the requirement to bow 
in the presence of a Vietnamese. Now in 
the atmosphere of relaxed camp disci-
pline, the "iron men" found it per-
sonally elevating to curse and ridicule a 
guard in a language that guards could 
barely understand, if at all. It may not 
be surprising that these hard-line beliefs 
did not surface until prisoners lived in 
large communities where the visibility 
of toughness had a larger audience. It is 
worth noting that these men were not 
those of senior rank with whom the 
final authority and responsibility rested. 
In fact, this antagonistic behavior con-
flicted with the "live and let live" policy 
issued by the senior officers during 
periods. of relative calm. 
There might have been an element of 
sincerity involved, or these men might 
have been motivated by the belief that 
prisoners should push for as much as 
they could get. The possibility also 
exists that an element of "one-upman-
ship" or a desire to atone for less stiff 
resistance in the early years of captivity 
might have been present. Whatever the 
motivation of these men, it was obvious 
that a strong desire for self-esteem 
existed among them. 
Other men also followed rules for 
personal conduct that was not a group 
characteristic-POW's motivated to con-
duct themselves in a manner they be-
lieved would best represent the United 
States to the North Vietnamese because 
they felt the POW's were the only 
Americans with whom most North Viet-
namese had contact. Although prison 
guards were by no means the elite of 
North Vietnamese society, they would 
eventually return to their villages and 
answer the inevitable question: "What 
were those Americans who bombed our 
country really like?" In other words, 
was the Vietnamese minister of propa-
ganda really telling the truth that U.S. 
pilots were bloodthirsty, arrogant, in-
sensitive criminals? 
These POW's believed that an 
attitude of aloofness, support of the 
U.S. Government, and resisting propa-
ganda efforts in a professional manner 
were what would ultimately gain respect 
for a POW as a man. Puerile actions such 
as belittling the DRV and its citizens 
merely supported the Communist claims 
that American POW's were the "black-
est criminals in the DRV." 
By November of 1970, most of the 
U.S. POW's were concentrated in one 
camp as a result of the U.S. commando 
raid on the Son Tay POW camp. Com-
munal living, with 20 to 50 men in a 
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single cell, marked the final experience 
for the veteran POW who endured the 
gamut of living conditions within the 
DRV. 
It was rather exciting to meet men 
whose names and background had been 
memorized but whose faces were here-
tofore unseen. New friendships were 
born; common acquaintances and ex-
periences were discovered; and time was 
passed listening to new stories and 
biographies. It was a time of high 
emotion compared to an earlier drab 
existence, but as one man candidly 
remarked, "It is a bit depressing to hear 
so many tell their stories and not hear 
one happy ending." 
The organization of the POW's 
within this larger camp was immediately 
structured in military fashion. Each cell 
had a senior ranking officer (SRO) with 
a staff of flight leaders. Every man was 
assigned to a flight with the flights 
alternating the menial housekeeping 
tasks of cleaning, distributing food, 
washing dishes, and clearing for com-
munications. 
Never did the Vietnamese permit 
contact between prisoners in different 
cells, and the senior officers were lo-
cated in a rather remote section of the 
camp. The establishment and protection 
of communication c1~annels became 
vital to the organization. Those respon-
sible for the transmission of information 
within the camp deserve a great deal of 
credit for a job well done. To some men 
the communication process occupied so 
much of their time that it became a way 
of life, a truly professional operation. 
Through their efforts, a close link 
was established between the leaders and 
the rest of the POW's, and a rather 
elaborate set of goals was promulgated 
to all POW's from the senior officer and 
his staff. 
These goals were embodied in what 
was known as the "plums." The plums 
covered many areas of duty in detail 
and identified our common goal. The 
compendium of those plums follows: to 
388 
support the Code of Conduct by doing 
and saying nothing harmful to the U.S. 
interests, to actively resist propaganda 
efforts of the Vietnamese, and to work 
together in order to go home with 
honor. These concepts were not new to 
the U.S. captives and had been implied 
by individual SRO's previously. How-
ever, the assurance that everyone would 
be presenting a united front to the 
enemy greatly increased the group's 
cohesiveness. 
The organization of POW's was essen-
tially involved with the Vietnamese in a 
struggle for control. The Vietnamese 
appeared to have an innate fear of an 
organized group of Americans, and, 
therefore, they rejected the terms of the 
Geneva Conventions of 1949. Ameri-
cans held in North Vietnam were never 
granted POW status but were con-
tinually referred to as "criminals" by 
the Vietnamese. By attributing any 
good treatment to their own benevo-
lence rather than to the just right of 
prisoners, a sense of authority was 
maintained in the minds of the Vietna-
mese. 
When security precautions dictated 
the POW's be concentrated in one camp, 
the camp authorities (as they always 
referred to themselves, thereby implying 
control) were especially wary. The Viet-
namese never recognized military rank 
among POW's and attempted to exert 
internal control by placing a junior 
officer in charge, thus reducing the 
structure and organization established 
by the POW's in that room. This rather 
puerile effort was eroded through uni-
versal resistance, and internal control 
remained with the SRO ostensibly as 
well as in fact. 
The idea of control is further typi-
fied by the manner in which the Viet-
namese resisted any suggestion for camp 
improvement if it came from a POW, 
whether or not the suggestion would be 
mutually beneficial. Thus, the POW's 
indirectly approached their captors to 
gain improved conditions rather than 
directly confronting them in a forth-
right manner. 
The rescinding of the early regulation 
that a POW bow before any Vietnamese 
indicated tacit admission by the Vietna-
mese that control of another's body did 
not constitute control of his will. With 
this admission, quizzes and attempts at 
political indoctrination, humorously 
naive and ineffective as they might have 
been, ceased altogether and propaganda 
efforts lessened toward resisting POW's. 
There is a distinct difference between 
propaganda for the purpose of indoc-
trinating prisoners and propaganda re-
leased to the world in order to sway 
public opinion. Indoctrination efforts 
caused little concern to the POW's and 
were often a source of entertainment or 
a source for tidbits of news from the 
outside world. However, the propaganda 
directed toward world opinions could 
not be predicted and therefore was a 
primary target of a POW's resistance 
efforts. The Hanoi parade of POW's in 
1966, the circulation of grotesque pic-
tures of pilots taken immediately after 
capture, the coercing of POW's by tor-
ture to meet with foreign visitors to 
Hanoi, the torturing of POW's to write 
good-treatment statements, or the circu-
lation of deceptive photographs sug-
gesting universal good treatment of pris-
oners were examples of such propa-
ganda. The POW's realized the harmful 
public effects these tactics could have, 
both on the U.S. war effort and on its 
allies, and were motivated to resist 
participation in these events to the same 
degree that they resisted providing the 
DRV military information. Thus, when 
torture for such devious reasons ceased 
in the later years, the POW felt some 
sense of relief. No longer was one forced 
to do these things against his will. An 
understanding of this perceived ex-
ploitation and the reasons for torture 
explains the bitterness of some re-
turnees against the DRV. 
Returning to the notion of control 
within the camp, it should be noted that 
the prisoners had their own ideas of 
control and influence. When it was felt 
that the mail situation was intolerable, a 
letter writing moratorium was enacted 
for a period of 9 months in order to 
create the impression that POW's were 
no longer allowed to correspond with 
their families. This would dispel any 
possible misconception that the treat-
ment of POW's was good, and it was 
hoped subsequent pressure on the DRV 
would prompt the Vietnamese to dis-
tribute more mail. 
On another occasion, prisoners were 
forbidden to hold religious services, to 
form a choir, or to have any POW speak 
in front of the group. This' restriction 
against religious services was met with a 
unified POW demonstration in which 
350 POW's throughout the camp started 
to yell and sing in unison. The reaction 
of the Vietnamese was greater than had 
been anticipated-they actually thought 
a revolt was in progress. Several senior 
POW officers were taken out of the 
camp, and the camp discipline was 
tightened. For several days the atmos-
phere within the camp was tense, but 
eventually the right to hold church 
services was won. Similar struggles for 
camp control, however, continued until 
the POW's were released. 
Even though a man is dedicated to 
group goals, he remains very much an 
individual. Manifestations of this in-
dividuality come in many forms such as 
the power need of those who controlled 
the communications4 or those who 
were prestige motivated and thus volun-
tarily filled the thankless roles of educa-
tion officer, entertainment officer, 
cigarette control officer, doctor, or 
chaplain when their rank did not war-
rant a role of leadership.5 
A few within the group could not 
resign themselves to accept camp im-
provement for fear such acceptance 
would compromise resistance. There-
fore, if a prisoner accepted any form of 
improved treatment, such as writing a 
Christmas card home or the use of a 
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pencil and paper, he would not be 
performing his duty. 
Perhaps reluctance to accept camp 
improvements in the DRV prisons could 
be explained by Maslow's metagrumble 
theory6 where such qualms could be 
present only in a truly self-actualizing 
man as he strove for perfection and thus 
rejected any compromise. A more likely 
explanation would be that the POW's 
possessed a basic distrust of the Viet-
namese and their motives-an attitude 
not without foundation. The North 
Vietnamese made propaganda a way of 
life and used religious services, medical 
treatment, and POW mail as bribes or 
exploitation. Small wonder that a popu-
lar expression among POW's was, 
"Beware of Gooks bearing gifts. " 
To a degree, attitudes within the 
formal POW organization -a source for 
POW motivation -changed during the 
final years. Motivation continued to 
become more altruistic or patriotic than 
egoistic within the POW organization, 
situationally enhanced by large group 
living. The managing and protection of a 
united organization provided an atmos-
phere that enabled thinking to be more 
long range and altruistic. A certain 
security was felt and a better oppor-
tunity was provided to perform as 
honorable men, as outlined in the or-
ganizational objectives. Could it be that 
the decision to support and participate 
in the activities of the large POW group 
was derived from agreement with its 
goals, or was it a desire to gain the 
personal protection afforded by group 
membership? There did exist the moral 
obligation to fulfill one's contract as a 
military officer. Perhaps a man was 
motivated by pure love of his cO!lntry, 
or was it a hatred of a philosophy so 
alien and detrimental to his survival? 
Was the POW's philosophy pragmatic or 
idealistic? 
It appeared that the POW was duty 
motivated and tended to be more al-
truistic as he became more actively a 
part of the larger POW organization. 
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The ego-centered pride motivation of 
initial captive days expanded to include 
consideration of other POW's and ideals. 
However, embodied within that duty 
were as many factors as there are 
caveats in the label of patriotism. 
It has been stated before that POW's 
resisted making statements harmful to 
the United States and its allies. But that 
is not to say the POW's agreed 100 
percent with all aspects of the war in 
Vietnam and the way in which it was 
conducted. The group of U.S. POW's in 
North Vietnam represented both liberal 
and conservative political philosophies, 
but there was universal agreement that 
the POW camp was not the place from 
which to air those views to the world. A 
POW had an obligation-yes, duty-to 
conduct himself in the manner expected 
of a POW as embodied in the spirit of 
the Code of Conduct. 
It was also the duty of a POW to 
remain a POW until released through 
government channels. Such reasoning 
supports a finding that a near universal 
rejection of the early releases by the 
DRV of a few officer POW's* from 
1968 to 1972 was a cohesive factor. The 
criticism of those accepting parole 
ranged from vocal condemnation to 
charitable doubt, but there was no one 
who defended the acceptance of early 
release as honorable behavior for an 
officer. The determination to avoid such 
stigma was a binding influence among 
resisting prisoners. 
One last observation is important. 
POW's in general felt that they had 
invested a long time serving as POW's in 
the war. Most of these men did not 
want their position undercut through 
the U.S. Government conceding defeat 
or its inability to win. Hence, the men 
*Of the POW's who were released early, 
only one man went home with the permission 
of the senior American officer in camp. No 
stigma was attached to this seaman's release 
by any POW. His resistance had been exem-
plary from capture to release. 
clung to their position of resistance to 
the last day. Some might call this 
irrational or just plain stubborn. But 
many POW's have said, after having 
spent more than 6 years in prison, they 
were willing to spend another year if it 
meant the difference between walking 
out of Vietnam or crawling out. They 
meant it! 
The comparison of POW communal 
life to standard group behavior theories 
is enormous. No doubt many aspects of 
prisoner existence will fill books of the 
future. Since these men will be collec-
tively evaluated, as were the Korean 
POW's, it does seem appropriate to 
conduct an examination of the Vietnam 
POW organizational effectiveness. An 
appropriate criteria by which to mea-
sure the effectiveness of any group is 
contained in the Field Theory of Lewin, 
The Interaction Process Analysis of 
Bales, and The Human Group Theory. 7 
These men have designated many fac-
tors that influence an organization's 
productivity, but some are more ger-
mane to this discussion than others. 
A common factor for a successful 
group in the theories of Bales and 
Homan is the requirement of positive 
interaction. The interaction among 
people who had lived in confined quar-
ters had been present whether desired or 
not. A characteristic of American POW's 
in the DRV had been their willingness 
to promulgate to all fellow captives 
personally tragic or triumphant prison 
experiences. Accounts of torture ses-
sions, quizzes, or personal thoughts 
were related regardless of whether a 
man's participation had been a point of 
pride or shame. Such revelations had 
helped others to learn vicariously and 
represented nearly perfect interaction. 
Events that occurred throughout the 
camp were transmitted to everyone. 
Sometimes listening to a POW sweep the 
hall or the camp courtyard with the 
tapcode rhythm was slightly reminiscent 
of listening to the evening news events 
of the day. 
Another standard of groups is con-
tained in the writings of Lewin 8 who held 
cohesion to be the key element of a 
successful group and tied it directly to 
the productivity of the body. 'rhe satis-
factions, the degree of closeness, the 
amount of pride, the ability to meet 
crises, and the willingness to be frank and 
honest in expressing ideas among mem-
bers of the group were some criteria 
needed for cohesiveness. Lewin's concept 
of cohesiveness, lacking among Korean 
POW's, provided an apt description of the 
Vietnam war POW's. The common goals, 
united actions, and other ipstances 
previously cited support this contention. 
The most comprehensive set of 
standards for a successful group was 
stated by Shepherd.9 He listed five 
features by which to measure group 
effectiveness: 
• Objectives: Is its purpose the 
same as that of its members? 
• Role Differentiation: Does each 
member know what is required of him? 
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• Values and Norms: Is that which 
is desired and that which is expected 
clear? 
• Membership: Is the membership 
clear-cut and heterogeneous? 
• Communication: No one with-
holds relevant information. 
All of these features as they apply to 
the U.S. prisoner organization in Viet-
nam have been examined within this 
paper. It is left to the reader to pass 
judgment on the organized group's ef-
fectiveness. 
For my part,· I would like to stress 
again that the high standards of 
behavior the U.S. POW's demanded of 
themselves were largely due to the 
personal integrity of these men. From 
one who has spent considerable time in 
their midst, I have nothing but the 
highest regard for them as military 
officers. America is fortunate to have 
been represented by such a select 
group under the most trying of circum-
stances. 
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